Many real-world systems are composed of interdependent networks that rely on one another. Such networks are typically designed and operated by different entities, who aim at maximizing their own interest. In this paper, we study the game over interdependent networks, investigating how the rational behaviors of entities impact the whole system. We first introduce a mathematical model to quantify the interacting payoffs among varying entities. Then we study the Nash equilibrium and compare it with the optimal social welfare. We reveal that the cooperation between different entities can be reached to maximize the social welfare only when the average degree of each network is constant. Otherwise, there may be a huge gap between the Nash equilibrium and optimal social welfare. Therefore, the rationality of different entities that operates these networks makes the system inherently deficient and even extremely vulnerable in some cases. Furthermore, we uncover some factors (such as weakening coupled strength of interdependent networks, designing suitable topology dependency of the system) that help reduce the gap and improve the system vulnerability.
In interdependent networks, nodes from one network rely on nodes from other networks. The failure of a node in one network causes its dependent node in other network to also fail, leading to an iterative cascade of failure. They are, consequently, much more fragile than independent networks [1] [2] . Much attention has been paid on how the interdependency of the networks results in the catastrophic cascade of failure and how to improve the robustness [3] [4] [5] [6] and repair the interdependent networks [7] .
In practice, different networks are typically designed and operated by varying entities [8] [9] [10] . For example, the power network and communication network are owned and operated by different companies in China. Each entity aims at maximizing its own interest when building the network, without considering the overall network performance. Clearly, there is a game during the formation of the interdependent networks, where a network is taken as a player. Studying such a game helps understand how the topology of the practical interdependent networks is formed, and provide insight into their inherent performance degradation, which has not been studied yet.
We introduce a mathematical framework based on random graph theory and percolation theory [11] for studying this game. The system is composed of n interdependent networks {N 1 , N 2 , · · · , N n } and the dependency is fixed. After a fraction 1 − p i of nodes randomly being removed from network N i , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there is an iterative cascade of failure. We denote that the fraction of nodes in giant component in network N i by P ∞,i (when the number of nodes approaches infinity, it represents the probability of the existence of the giant component) which is a function of p 1 , . . . , p n . Let k i be the average degree of network N i . The payoff of a network N i is the difference of the income I i and cost O i associated with operating and building the network. Clearly, the income is positively correlated to the fraction of nodes in mutually connected giant component P ∞,i [1] (i.e., the ratio of functional nodes), and is denoted by I i (P ∞,i ). As P ∞,i is a function of p j , j ∈ {1, 2, . . ., n}, we can regard I i as a function of p j , j ∈ {1, 2, . . ., n}. Since constructing and operating links incur expense, we can assume that the cost function O i increases with the average degree of the network, i.e., O i ( k i ).
As the fraction p i of nodes that fail in network N i is not a constant in real world and affected by many factors (such as weather condition for power network [12] ), we suppose that it follows a probability distribution ψ i , that is, P(p i < α) = α 0 ψ i (x)dx. Then we can compute the mathematical expectation E(I i ) of the income I i . The payoff Y i of the network N i is thus:
And the payoff Y of the whole system (a.k.a. social welfare) is
Note that increasing k may not always improve social welfare since both the income and the cost increase with k . In a cooperative system, an optimal k can be calculated to maximize the social welfare. Take for an example of two interdependent ER networks with the same average degree k [13] , the cascade process is a first order percolation transition which is discontinuous at threshold p c . It has been shown that the threshold p c = 2.4554/ k [1] . We assume, for simplicity, that the income I is 0 when p < p c , and I = 1 when p > p c , and that the fraction of nodes being removed p follows a uniform distribution. The cost function O is set to be a linear function with coefficient 0.08. Then, as the social welfare is
Clearly, higher k leads to higher income as well as higher cost. It is easy to compute the optimal social welfare at k = 5.54 and Y = 0.11 [14] [15] . Unfortunately, the average degree is in generic implicit in p c and P ∞,i , which makes the analysis complicated. We introduce real variables {q i }, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, as strategy profiles to quantify the construction pattern of network N i by the entity i. We suppose that the strategy set of entity i is Q i , i.e., the range of variable q i , and Q = Q 1 × . . . × Q n is the set of strategy profiles in this game. Let q −i be the strategy profile of all entities except for player i. According to [16] , the degree distribution of a node in network N i can be characterized by P i (k, q i ). For instance, q i could be average degree for an ER network decided by entity i. We introduce the generating function of network N i whose arguments are x and q i as
Different from previous studies [16] [17], the strategy q i is included in the generating function to assist the analysis of the game. The average degree k i of network N i can be calculated as
which is a continuous function of q i . Analogously, we introduce the generating function of the underlying branching process
where
is the derivative of G with respect to x. The probability that a randomly chosen surviving nodes belongs to giant component is given by
where f i satisfies
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Similar to [2] [18], for fixed q i , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we can solve the equations of unknowns x i and y i j
where r ji ≥ 0 is the fraction of nodes in network N i , that directly depends on nodes of network N j and r ii = 0. We can analytically compute that the fraction P ∞,k = x k g k (x k ) of nodes in giant component of network N k as a function of p 1 , . . . , p n and q 1 , . . . , q n . Specially, if n = 2, equation (9) yields y 12 = p 1 ,
Equations (8) can be simplified as:
If the process of cascade is a first order percolation transition, there is a single step discontinuity at the threshold p c , which is also a function of q i [4] ; otherwise, we let p c = 0. According to equation (1), we calculate the payoff
ψ j (p j )dp 1 . . . dp n
From (2), we can compute the social welfare Y = ∑ n i=1 Y i of the whole system. When each entity i ∈ {1, . . . , n} chooses strategy q i , the payoff of entity i is denoted by Y i (q) and the payoff of the system is denoted by Y (q).
Before presenting our main results, we give the following definitions. A strategy profile q * ∈ Q achieves optimal social welfare if
A strategy profile q * ∈ Q is a Nash equilibrium if
In our model, when the average degree is fixed, that is, O i ( k i ) is unchanged about q i for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, this is a positive-sum game. In equations (8) and (9), g i are monotonously increasing functions on [0, 1]. We can prove that all P ∞,i are positively correlated in interdependent networks. Since all O i are fixed, according to (12) , Y i , i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., n}, are positively correlated too. This indicates that it will not reduce other entities' payoffs when one entity changes his strategy profile to improve his own payoff. It is easy to see that Nash equilibrium reaches the optimal social welfare. Therefore, in such scenario, the individual payoff of each entity is maximized at the same point as the optimal social welfare. The cooperation between different networks can be reached.
For example, for the game over interdependent scale-free (SF) networks whose strategy space is the power of degree distribution, as [1] shows, a higher power leads to an improvement of the system's robustness. Due to the above conclusion, when the average degree is fixed, the entities of different networks can cooperate to improve the power of distribution as high as possible and reach the optimal social welfare.
However, if each O i is not fixed, the cooperation between different networks may be unattainable. In fact, if the real variables q 1 , . . . , q n can range in some interval continuously (that is, this is a continuous game), the cooperation is not reachable. With out loss of generality, we can assume that payoff functions are differential. Then the necessary condition for a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is ∂Y i /∂ q i = 0, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The necessary condition for the optimal social welfare in this game is ∂Y /∂ q i = 0, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
We proceed to analyze the game when the average degree can be adjusted by q i of each network N i . When the payoff of this system achieves its Nash equilibrium
Note that for a j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, k i does not rely on q j if j = i, leading to ∂ O i /∂ q j = 0. At the Nash equilibrium, we get
Due to the interdependency, the incomes of n networks, which are decided by the robustness of the system, are positively correlated. ∂ E(I i (P ∞,i )))/∂ q j have the same sign and do not equal to 0, leading to ∂Y /∂ q j = 0. Therefore, Nash equilibrium (since the concrete payoff function is given here, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium may not exist. However, our model can be easily extended to the mixed strategy game in which Nash equilibrium always exists [14] .) deviates from optimal social welfare. The cooperation between different interdependent networks can not be reached. The rationality of different entities that operates these networks makes the system inherently deficient.
Next we analyze our model for concrete interdependent networks. For coupled Random Regular (RR) networks, we set q i ∈ Z + to be their average degree k i (i ∈ {1, 2}). Then we have G i (x, q i ) = x q i and H i = x q i −1 . For equations (10) and (11) , g i is shown in equation (6) . We have P ∞,1 = xg 1 (x) and P ∞,2 = yg 2 (y). Let I i and O i be linear functions whose coefficients are 1 and 0.008 in equation (1) and the distributions of p 1 and p 2 be uniform distributions. Since the average degree of RR network only can be integer, the game over interdependent RR networks is discrete. By numerical validation, we have the matrix form and get the Nash equilibrium and social optimum of this discrete game. TABLE.I is the game matrix for the case where two networks are totally interdependent r 12 = r 21 = 1. From this matrix, we can calculate that q 1 = q 2 = 9 is the social optimum and q 1 = q 2 = 7 is the Nash equilibrium. Similarly, we can get the Nash equilibrium and social optimum for partially interdependent networks.
For two coupled ER networks, we set q i to be their average degree k i (i ∈ {1, 2}). Then we have
Similarly to the first example, set I i and O i to be linear functions whose coefficients are 1 and 0.05 and the distribution of p i be uniform distribution. As FIG.1 shows, we can solve Y 1 and Y 2 as functions of q 1 and q 2 . By numerical simulation, we can obtain the Nash equilibrium and social optimum for this game. For instance, in the case of two totally coupled ER networks, we get that this game reaches its social optimum at k 1 = k 2 =4.37 with Y =0.54 and reaches its Nash equilibrium at k 1 = k 2 =3.09 with Y =0.49. 
to evaluate this game. The higher ∆ is, the closer the payoffs at at Nash equilibrium and social optimum are. Set r 12 = r 21 = r ≤ 1 in equations (10) and (11), we evaluate our model for interdependent networks with different coupled strength (i.e. with different r). As FIG.2 and ∆ are not strictly decreasing about r. However in general, the system is more profitable and efficient as a result of reducing coupled strength.
From the above examples of RR networks and ER networks, we can see that the rational behaviors will make the system not to reach the optimal robustness and become more vulnerable. As FIG.3 shows, we get the P ∞ − p graph at Nash equilibrium and social optimum respectively for r = 1 and r = 0.6. The threshold is higher and P ∞ is lower at Nash equilibrium in the same scenario. Note that the system of interdependent networks is more vulnerable at Nash equilibrium as a result of rationality intuitively. It is important to find a way of reducing gap between optimal social welfare and Nash equilibrium for the game over interdependent networks. Besides reducing coupled strength, surprisingly, we find that the gap is narrower for the system with suitable dependency topology. We test our model for interdependent networks with different dependency topology. Let all coupled networks be totally interdependent. According to one-to-one correspondence [19] , randomly removing 1 − p i fractions of nodes from each network N i are equivalent to a single attack on one of the networks which removes 1 − p = 1 − ∏ 5 i=1 p i fraction of nodes. Set the distribution of p to be uniform and I i and O i be linear functions with coefficients 1 and 0.035 in equations (1) for RR networks and 1 and 0.025 for ER networks. We validate the cases of chain-like and star-like system formed from five networks ( See FIG.4) . By numerical simulations, we gain that the star-like oligarch dependency topology tends to reduce the gap and improve the payoff (See TABLE.II) .
Summarizing, in this paper we study the influence of rational behavior on the whole system. We reveal that, in the continuous game, the cooperation between different networks is reachable only when the average degree of each network is fixed in strategy space. While in general, there is a huge gap between the Nash equilibrium and optimal social welfare as a result of rationality which makes interdependent networks inherent deficient. We reveal and validate some factors (including weakening coupled strength of interdependent networks and designing suitable topology dependency of system) that help reduce the gap and improve the deficiency and overall payoff.
Interdependent networks exist in all aspects of our life, nature and technology. The game over interdependent networks is more complicated in real world since besides the fraction of giant component and average degree, the payoff may rely on many factors and need further investigation. It is of great importance to find other efficient ways of reducing the gap between Nash equilibrium and optimal social welfare and improving the vulnerability and payoff. This work is supported by NSFC project (No. 61528105). We thank Prof. Yang-Yu Liu at Harvard university for his valuable suggestion, Zidong Yang and Yongtao Zhang at Zhejiang university for their insightful discussions.
